People v. Quicke by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository




Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, People v. Quicke 61 Cal.2d 155 (1964).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/716
:Mar.19G4] PEOJ>l,E V. QmCKE 
161 C.2d 155; 37 CaJ.Rplr. 617. 390 P.2d 3931 
155 
[Cl'im. No. 7368. In Bank. March 20, 1964.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CARL AL-
l"RED QUJ CKE, Defendaut and Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-First Degree Murder-Deliberation and Premedi-
tation.-To !<upport a fil'!'1 d('I:P'('(' murder v(!rdict direct evi-
dene(' of n ddibeTllt~ and prl'lIwditated purpose to kill is not 
required. The nI'C('!I!<nry elements of deliberation andpl'ellll'di-
tntion may bl' infernoil from proof of such facts and circulll-
stnnces as will furnish a re:lsollable foundation for sucll an 
inference. • 
[2] Id.-Evidence-First Degree Murder.-A verdict of first de-
. gree murder in a prosecution for the ldlling of a girl was 
supported h~' evidl'nee thnt dl'fendant spent the aftf'rnoon of 
the dny of the crimI' looJ,inp: for. ~ir]!;, that he WIIS ('ontem-
plating s('xlwl irtt<'l'(,Olll'!<", 1 hat he followed the !;allle pro(,I'-
dure with tIl(' vidiJlI that hI' had uf<ed l'uel'eflsfnJly two weeks 
before with another /.!'irl ",110 ('npitulnted beclluse lwr life WIiS 
thr('atell('(l, nnd that h(' I']l~ag('d in intereourl'e nfter the vic-
tim was dl'nd, thus iudicating that defendant., on precollcl'ived 
reflection, dl'liberntely formed a plan to coerce the victim into 
engl1~ing in illt(')·cOUl'!'(, with him while she was nlive, or if 
that failed, to kill h{'r to satisfy his desires Witll her corpse. 
{S] Criminal Law-Conduct of Judge-Remarks to Jury.-A 
judge's r(,JIl11l'ks to a jury nfter it had returned a vl'rdict 
imposin~ the dl'nth pellalty cOllllllending the jurors on their 
fortitude and cOllllllellting that he sincerely felt it was the 
only verdict they could return Rnd be fair to society did not 
show bias, but mel'el;y r('flected an opinion formed by the court 
after henring all the t<,!'till1on~' nnd observing the witnesses. 
[4] Id.-New Trial-Hearing and Determination.-That the trial 
court, in denying defendant'!; motion for a new trial, stated 
that it agJ'eed with the jury's verdiet finding defendant guilty 
of first degree murder, but did not state its concurrence in the 
jury's finding that deft'ndnnt was legally sane, did not indi-
cate that the court failed to review the evidence, nor was it 
sufficient to rebut the presumption that the court performed 
its duty, where there was ample evidence of defendant's 
sanity, thus probably leading the court to believe it was un-
neeessa~'y to indicate its assent to the sanity verdict. 
[1] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, §§ 86, 87, 172 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Homicide (1st cd §§ 42, 464, 46c). 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] HOillil'ide, § 15(2); r2] HOll1ieide, 
~ 145(3); [3] Criminal Law, § 329(1); [4] Criminal Law, § 969; 
[5] Criminal Law, § 1011.1. 
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[5] Id.-Punishment-Procedure for' Determining Penalty-In-
structions.-On the penalty phase of a first degree murder 
case, it was re\"ersible errOl· to instruct that the jury, in 
making its determination as to the penalty to be imposed, 
could eonsider the possibility that a defendant sentenced 
either to death or life imprisonment Dlay be pardoned or have 
his sentence reduced by the Governor, and that a prisoner 
serving a life sentence may be paroled after serYing at least 
seven years, where, from a discussion between the jury and 
the trial judge after the jury had deliberated for several 
hours, it wa;; clear that the jury chose the death penalty be-
cause of its misgivings as to the success of the Adult Au-
thority in protecting society and its quulifications to do so. 
APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange 
County. Ronald M. Crookshank, Judge. Affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
Prosecution for murder. JUdgment of conviction impos-
ing the death penalty reversed insofar as it relates to the 
penalty and in all other respects affirmed. 
Frank L. Williams, Jr., Public Defender, for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, As-
sistant Attorney General, and Norman H. Sokolow, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAY1\OR, .J.-A jury found defendant guilty of murder 
in the first degree, found that he was sane at the time of the 
killing, and fixed the penalty at deatll. The trial court denied 
a motion for new trial. The appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, 
§ 1239, subd. (b).) 
Defendant, 18 years old, left his home in Lompoc in the 
early morning of Xovember 8, 1962, to look for work. He was 
unable to find work and drove to Orange, where he arrived in 
the early afternoon. He stopped repeatedly to put water into 
his aut~mobile. which was overheating because of a leak in 
the radiator. From Orange he went to Santiago Canyon, 
where he once Ii.ed. During the course of the afternoon he 
spent considerable time looking for girls. He told a young 
male friend that "he was going to get a piece before he left 
the canyon" and that be was "going to get a piece from V-
" a local girl. He tried unsuccessfully to find this girl 
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and several other girls he had known in Santiago Canyon. He 
then remembered Susan Nash, the victim, with whom he had 
gone to school. At about 6 :30 or 7 o'clock in the evening he 
called on her at her home, and she agreed to go with him to a 
drive-in movie. 
According to defendant's extrajudicial statements and his 
testimony at the trial, he and :Mis.') Nash went to the drive-in 
theater, left there at about 1 a.m. and drove in the direction 
of :Miss Nash's home. On the way up the canyon the auto-
mobile overheated, and df'f{'ndant stopped at the side of the 
road. After talking for a few minutes, defendant put his 
right arm aroulld :Miss Nasll and tri{'d to kiss her. She re-
sisted, saying "she didn't kiss 011 the first date." D('fendant 
placed his right hand tightly over her mouth and nose, 
pulled her toward him and held her. 'Yhen she attempted to 
attract the attention of a passing motorist by blowing the 
horn, defelldant puned her hand from the horn ring and in 
doing so broke the ring. She got free after a struggle and 
asked to be taken llOme. 'Vhen defendant refused, she asked 
"'Vhat kind of girl do you think I am'" Defendant replied 
that he thought she was a "very nice girl." She then said, 
"'Well, you sure aren't acting like it." Defendant again 
placed his hand over her mouth and nose, and shortly there-
after began to strangle her. He released her once and finding 
that she was gasping for air, strangled her again until "she 
just didn't seem tllat she was breathing any more. " 
Although defendant thought :Miss Nash was dead, he re-
moved his belt, "looped it around her neck," and pulled it 
tight. He then drove 6 miles to a more isolated area, spent 
several minutes smoking, and after fondling the body, un-
dressed it and took off most of his own clothes. He pulled the 
body into the back seat where he fondled the "agina, bit a 
br{'ast, and had sexual intercourse with the body. 
Approximately two llOurs later two police officers noticed 
the parked automobile and found defendant asleep in the 
back seat with the body. Defendant willingly made several 
statements, wllich were tape-recorded, relating the events of 
the evening. He denied intending to have intercourse with 
tIle victim before he killed ller and denied intending to kill 
her. He e.xplained that llis behavior was caused by llis having 
been jilted frequently and by his being angered by the vic-
tim's rE'fusal to kiss him. j 
At t1le trial dpfendant anmittNl that two weeks bpfore the 
killing he had smothpred anothp.r girl by holding his hand 
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tightly over her mouth and nose until she agreed to engage in 
sexual intercourse with him. This girl testified that she ac-
cepted defendant'8 invitation to go to a drive-in movie and I 
that he refused to take her home after the movie, saying that 1 
he wanted "to go riding for a while." He then took her to I 
an isolated area, where he attempted to kiss her and asked 
her to get into the back seat of his automobile. She refused to 
kiss him, stating that she had a sore throat from tonsilitis. i 
Defendant placed his hand over her mouth and nose making I 
it '~hard to breatlJe." She testified that she was so fright- \' 
ened that she agreed to get into the back seat and do w11at he I,;, 
wanted. 
Defendant contends that since he testified tllat he did not 
intend to ki1l or to rape and cllOked the victim only because 
he was frustrated and angered by her refusal to kiss him alld 
since tIl ere was no direct testimony as to his state of mind, 
the evidence does not support a finding of intentional, pre-
meditated killing or of killing in the perpetration of rape. 
[1] To support tIle verdict, however, "direct eyidt.'lIce or 
a deliberate and premeditated purpose to kill is not required. 
The necessary elements of deliberation and premeditation 
may be inferred from proof ofsueb facts and circumstances 
as will furnish a reasonable foundation for such an infer-
ence." (People v. Oartier, 54 Cal.2d 300, 305-306 [5 Cal. 
Rptr. 573,353 P.2d53].) A findillg of specific intent to rape 
may also be bascd on inferences from the evidence. (People v. 
Oheary,48 Cal.2d 301, 310 [309 P.2d 431]; see also People v. 
Robillard, 55 Cal.2d 88, 93 [10 Ca1.Rptr.167, 358 P.2d 295, 83 
A.L.R.2d 1086] ; People v. Lot.'c, 53 Ca1.2d 843, 850-851 [3 Cal. 
Rptr. 665, 350 P.2d 705].) 
[2] The evidence supports the verdict of murder in the 
first degree on the ground that the killing was intentional 
and premeditated or that it was done in tIle perpetration of 
rape. Defendant spent the afternoon of tIle killing in Santi-
ago Canyon looking for gir1s. That he was contemplating 
sexual intercourse is shown by his stateme~t that he was 
"going to get a piece before he left the canyon" and b~· his 
seeldng the girl he said he was going to get it from. Defend-
ant followed the same procedure witll tIle victim tl1at ]Ie had 
used successfully two weeks before. At the point where her 
predecesso\- capitulated because her life WfiR threatened. the 
victim remained adamant, and defendant killed her. He then 
drove to It less travelled arit!a and took considprable paim; to 
arrange the corpse for intercourse. The similarity in details 
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of the two evenings, the fact that the defendant used such 
force as to threaten the first girl's life, the fact that he 
engaged in intercourse after the victim was dead, and the 
circumstances indicating that he went to Santiago Canyon 
with tIle intention of having sexual intercourse, support the 
inference that upon preconceived reflection he deliberately 
formed a plan to coerce the victim into engaging in inter-
course witll him while she was alive, or if that failed, to kill 
her to satisfy his desires with her corpse. 
Defendant concedes that under the M'Naughton test, the 
evidence adduced at the sanity trial is sufficient to support 
the jury's finding that he was legally sane,1 but contends 
that we s110uid replace tl1at test by the one proposed in 1962 
by the Special Commissions on Insanity and Criminal 
Offenders.2 We are not persuaded to do so, }lOwever, and 
adhere to our numerous decisions on the subject. (People v. 
Nash, 52 Ca1.2d 36, 48 [338 P.2d 416] ; People v. Darling, 58 
Ca1.2d 15, 22-23 [22 Ca1.Rptr. 484. 372 P.2d 316] ; People v. 
Rittger, 54 Cal.2d 720, 732 [7 Cal.Rptr. 901, 355 P.2d 645] ; 
People v. Berry, 44 Ca1.2d 426.433 [282 P.2d 861]; People v. 
Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876. 8f14 [256 P.2d 911].) 
Defendant contends t1111t the trial judge was biased and 
that he failed to review the evidence as required by section 
1181 of the Penal Code before passing on a motion for new 
trial. (People y. Love, 56 Ca1.2d 720, 728 [16 Ca1.Rptr. 777, 
17 Ca1.Rptr. 481, 366 P.2d 33, 809] ; People v. Moore, 53 Cal 
2d 451,454 [348 P.2d 584].) 
[3] When the jury returned its verdict imposing the 
death penalty, the court commended the jurors on their forH-
tude and stated, "I sincerely feel it's the only verdict you 
('ould return and be fair to society." This statement does Dot 
IOn the basis of defendant's history, a personal interview with him, 
and a medical examination, each psychiatrist concluded that though 
defendant suffered from a sociopathic personality disorder, he was 
legally sane at the time of the killing. The only evidenee that defendant 
did not know the nature and quality of his act or that it was wrong was 
a statement by deft'ndant report.ed by two of the psychiatrists that when 
he strangled the victim he did not know what he was doing. Defendant 
told the third doctor, however, that he strangled her. beeallse he was 
angered by her refusal to kiss him. 
2" A person is not criminally responsible for an act if, .. t the time 
of the commission of such act, as a lIIubstantinl consequence of mental 
disorder, lIe did not have adequate capacity to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of the law which he is alleged to have violated." 
Spt'eial Commissions on Insanity and Criminal Offenders, First Rt'port, 
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show bias, but merely reflects an opinion formed by the court 
after hearing all the testimony and observing the witnesses. 
There is nothing in the comment to suggest that the judge 
was prejudiced against defendant or that his opinion was so 
firmly settled that he could not objectively reappraise the 
evidence. (Cf. McEwen v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 172 Cal. 
6,9-11 [155 P. 86J.) . 
[4] Defendant contends, however, that the court did not 
in fact review the evidence. After denying defendant's mo· 
tion for new trial without comment, the court, in summariz-
ing the proceedings before passing judgment, stated that the 
jury had found defendant guilty of murder in the first de-
gree and that the court agreed with this finding. Thus the 
court indicated its independent approval of t11at verdict. The 
court, however, did not state its concurrence in the jury's 
finding that defendant was legally sane. Defendant points to 
this omission as evidence to support his claim that the trial 
court did not review the evidence relating to defendant's 
sanity. 
The court's failure to state its agreement with the jury's 
finding was not sufficient to rebut the presumption that the 
court performed its duty. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 15; 
see People v. Hooton, 53 Cal.2d 85, 88 [346 P.2d 199].) 
Moreover, the only witnesses at the sanity trial, three court-
appointed psychiatrists, unanimously agreed that defendant 
was legally sane. Two of the psychiatrists noted that defend-
ant had stated to them that he did not know what he was 
doing when he strangled the victim, but defendant told the 
third doctor that he had strangled her because 11e was angered 
by her refusal to ki~s him. It was probably because of the 
ample evidence of defendant's sanity that the court did not 
find it necessary to indicate its assent to the jury's verdict. 
[5] At the penalty trial the court instructed the jury 
that" In making your determination as to the penalty to be 
imposed, you may consider that the laws of California pro-
vide that a defendant sentenced either to death or life im-
prisonment ma., be pardoned or have his sentence reduced by 
the Governor and that a prisoner serving a life sentence may 
be paroled, but not until he has served at least seven years. " 
In People v. Morse, 60 Ca1.2d 631, 643 [36 Ca1.Rptr. 201, 388 
P.2d 33], we held such an instruction erroneous on the 
ground that the ., function of the jury is to consider the facts 
surrounding the crime and deft'ndant '8 background, and upon 
that basis, reach its dt'cision. The jury s110uld not be in-
vited to decide if the defendant will be fit for release in the 
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future; it should not at all be involved in the issue of the 
time, if any, when the defendant, should be released; it 
should not be propelled into weighing the possible conse-
quences of the Authority's administrative action." We have 
no doubt in the present case that the error was prejudicial. 
The jurors indicated that their decision on the penalty was 
dependent on their evaluation of •• the success of the Adult 
Authority in protecting society." After several hours of de-
liberation on the penalty, the jury returned to the courtroom 
to ask several questionsB and also to request that Mr. Spang-
ler, the administrative officer of the Adult Authority, be re-
called. These questions and the request to recall Mr. Spangler 
demonstrate the jurors' concern with the possibility of de-
fendant's being paroled if given a life sentence and with the 
likelihood of recidivism if he were paroled. The jury retired 
and returned somewhat later when, in response to an inquiry 
by the court, the foreman indicated that the jury was evenly 
divided and a verdict seemed "unlikely." He explained the 
jury's difficulties in the following discussion with the court: 
"MR. PEIRCE: ... The reason we are requesting additional 
information is to help satisfy the concern of various people 
for various interests in the matter, the protection of society. 
THE COURT: I understand. MR. PEmcE: Things of this 
nature ... it's a sort of technical type legal discussion thing. 
I would like to tell you a little further about--not about why 
the feelings exist, but about what kinds of concern are evi-
denced by members of the Jury on one side or the other and 
explain, if possible, why I and others feel that other informa-
tion would be helpful in reaching a decision. THE COURT: 
All right, you may do so. MR. PEIRCE; One of' the concerns 
that seems to be evidenced is what-well, one of the questions 
we asked was a statistical sort of a thing and the reason for 
that question was to determine further in our own minds 
what the qualifications were of the California Adult Author-
ity in, let's say, what is the degree of success, its degree of 
success had been from a historical standpoint in protecting 
8(a) "The first-degree murder, what percentages suffer eoeiopathie 
eharaetert .. 
(b) "First-degree murder, what pereentage eommit major erimes, 
meaning murder of the first or seeond degree or felonies after their 
first parole t .. • 
(e) "First-degree murderers suffering from lIoeiopathie eharaeter, 
what pereentage eommitted major erimes after their first parolet" 
(d) "What is the ratio of death penalties versus life imprisonment 
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society in similar circumstances as we are in here. THE 
COURT: Of course, the trouble is each ease is very individ-
ual. You can't look in the book and come up with the answer. 
MR. PEIRCE: Well, suppose, for eXample, that crimes of 
similar nature had been committed in the past. We were won-
dering if information is available on what sort of chances for 
success, rehabilitation were evident from information about 
the behavior of people who have been in similar situations, in 
prison for a term and then released; . information about the 
duration of confinement for persons convicted of similar 
crimes, the nature and extent of psychological help that 
might be available to thcm. In other words, what chances 
were offered, what facilities, what personnel were available 
for psychological .assistance to a person in need of that' 
Let's see, some of tlle other kinds of things that were cross-
ing our minds. I guess that expressed in general the t~"P(' of 
information 've thought would help us on reaching a conclu-
sion about the-I guess I could say the success of the Adult 
Authority in protecting society, hopefully, once again, based 
on crimes of similar nature. THE COURT: I don't know 
what I can add to what I have already said. You haven't 
deliberated very long today, I will let you deliberate a little 
longer, then I will talk to you again." Three and one-half 
hours later the jury returned with its verdict. 
It is clear from tIle foregoing discussion that the jury 
chose the death penalty because of its misgivings as to the 
success of the Adult Authority in protecting society and its 
qualifications to do so. A new trial on the issue of penalty is 
therefore necessary. 
The judgment is reversed insofar as it relates to the pen-
alty. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., eon-
curred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur generally in the reasoning of the 
opinion authored by Mr. Justice Traynor; in the affirmance 
of the judgment in all respects other than as to penalty; and 
in the reversal of the judgment insofar as it . relates to tht' 
penalty phas~ because of the instruction on possibility of 
parole and possibility of pardon or reduction of sentence by 
the Go,'ernor, the giving of which we held to be in error in 
People v. Morse (1964) 60 Ca1.2d 631, 636 [la]-653 [ld] [36 
Ca1.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33]. However. in weighing the effect 
of that error (i.t'., articulating the basis for our conclusion of 
./ 
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prejudice), Justice Traynur's opinion appears to stress only 
the fact thL~ the jury interrupted their deliberations to ask 
several questions relating to the probability of defendant'R 
being paroled and the likelilJOod of recidh'ism in sue}) evcnt. 
In concurring, I empl)asize t11at tlle record before us also 
contains the two other elements accentuated in Morse (at 
pp. 652-653 [6a] of 60 Ca 1.2d) as eontributing to the totality 
"of the rntire cause" (Ca1. Const., art VI, § 41,6) upon "'hich 
totality we found prejudicial effect of the crror: i.e., (1) the 
fact that (as Justicc Traynor impliedly recognizes by refer-
ring to the jury's request to "recall" the witness Spangler) 
a substantial mass of evidence was introduced as to the as-
serted statistical averages of prison terms aetually served by 
persons sentenced to life imprisonment for first degre(' mur-
der, and (2) the faet tJlIlt the prosecntor (and likewise defenRC' 
counsel) commented at length on this material in argument 
to the jury. I conclude that all of these elements (i.e., the 
totality "of the entire eause" as contemplated by the ex-
plicit mandate of our Constitution) combine to make it ap-
pear "reasonably probable t])at a reRult more favorable to 
defendant as to pcnalty would have been reached in the ab-
sence of thE' error." (People Y. Morse (1964) supra, 60 
Ca1.2d 631, 653 [6a] : People v. Watson (1956) 46 Ca1.2d 818, 
835 [12] - 838 [13] [299 P.2d 243].) 
McCOMB, J., Concurring and Dissenting-I would affirm 
the judgment in itc;; entirety. (See my concurring and dis-
Rentin~ opinion in People v. Hines, post, p. 182 [37 Cal.Rptr. 
622,390 P.2d 398].) 
RE'spondent's petition for a rehearing was denied April 15, 
1964. McComb, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
